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Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication is
anticipated to be widely applied in the forthcoming fifth-
generation (5G) wireless networks, due to its many advantages
such as low cost, high mobility, and on-demand deployment.
However, the broadcast and line-of-sight (LoS) nature of air-
to-ground wireless channels gives rise to a new challenge on
how to realize secure UAV communications with the destined
nodes on the ground. This paper aims to tackle this challenge by
applying the physical layer security technique. We consider both
the downlink and uplink UAV communications with a ground
node, namely UAV-to-ground (U2G) and ground-to-UAV (G2U)
communications, respectively, subject to a potential eavesdropper
on the ground. In contrast to the existing literature on wireless
physical layer security only with ground nodes at fixed or quasi-
static locations, we exploit the high mobility of the UAV to
proactively establish favorable and degraded channels for the
legitimate and eavesdropping links, respectively, via its trajectory
design. We formulate new problems to maximize the average
secrecy rates of the U2G and G2U transmissions, respectively, by
jointly optimizing the UAV’s trajectory and the transmit power
of the legitimate transmitter over a given flight period of the UAV.
Although the formulated problems are non-convex, we propose
iterative algorithms to solve them efficiently by applying the block
coordinate descent and successive convex optimization methods.
Specifically, the transmit power and UAV trajectory are each
optimized with the other being fixed in an alternating manner,
until the algorithms converge. Simulation results show that the
proposed algorithms can improve the secrecy rates for both U2G
and G2U communications, as compared to other benchmark
schemes without power control and/or trajectory optimization.
Index Terms—5G and UAV communications, physical layer
security, secrecy rate maximization, trajectory design, power
control.
I. INTRODUCTION
With many advantages such as high mobility, low cost,
wide coverage, and on-demand deployment, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) have been extensively used in both military
and civilian applications, such as search and rescue, inspection
and surveillance, cargo transportation, etc. Recently, UAVs
have also found increasingly more substantial applications
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in wireless communication [2], and are expected to play
a significant role in the forthcoming fifth-generation (5G)
wireless networks [3], [4]. To seize this growing opportunity,
internationally leading telecommunication companies such as
Qualcomm, Ericsson, and China Mobile have already launched
their research projects on integrating UAVs into the 5G
networks [5], [6]. Generally speaking, there are two main
paradigms of UAV applications in 5G. In the first one, termed
as “UAV-assisted wireless communication”, UAVs are utilized
as airbone communication platforms such as mobile base
stations (BSs) and/or relays that can be flexibly deployed
on demand to assist the communications in terrestrial net-
works such as 5G. For example, UAV-mounted BSs can be
used to enable rapid wireless communication service recovery
after ground infrastructure damages, or provide offloading
service for terrestrial BSs in extremely crowded areas [7]–
[15]. Another example is to use UAVs as mobile relays to
provide reliable connectivity between distant users in remote
areas (e.g., an uninhabited desert) that are not covered by
any existing wireless networks [16], [17]. Moreover, in future
internet of things (IoT) applications, UAVs can be dispatched
to disseminate/collect data to/from widespread distributed
wireless devices efficiently and with low cost [18]–[20]. By
contrast, in the other paradigm, known as “cellular-enabled
UAV communication”, UAVs are regarded as new “sky” users
in the cellular networks that enable two-way communications
of the UAVs with ground BSs. For example, the future 5G
networks can provide reliable communications for UAVs even
beyond the range of their operators’ visual line-of-sight (LoS)
to achieve long-range UAV control in real time [21]. Besides,
in UAV-enabled surveillance applications, the captured pic-
tures and/or videos by the UAVs in real time can be uploaded
timely to the ground data centers via the 5G networks [22].
In the aforementioned UAV communication applications
in 5G, due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels,
their security and privacy are of utmost concern [23], [24].
One major advantage of UAV-ground communications is that
UAVs usually have LoS channels for the communications with
ground nodes, especially in outdoor environments. However,
such LoS communication links are also more prone to the
eavesdropping by illegitimate nodes on the ground, which
gives rise to a new security challenge. Although security
was conventionally viewed as a higher layer communication
protocol stack design problem that can be tackled by using
cryptographic methods, physical layer security has emerged
as a promising alternative way of defense to realize secrecy
in wireless communication.
A key design metric that has been widely adopted in
2physical layer security is the so-called secrecy rate [23]–
[35], at which confidential message can be reliably transmitted
without having the eavesdropper infer any information about
the message. A non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved when
the strength of the legitimate link is stronger than that of
the eavesdropping link. In the existing literature on physical
layer security, communication nodes are usually assumed to
be at fixed or quasi-static locations. As a result, the average
channel quality of the legitimate/eavesdropping link mainly
depends on the path loss and shadowing from the transmitter to
receiver, which are determined if the locations of the legitimate
transmitter/receiver and the eavesdropper are given. Thus, in
the case that the average channel gain of the legitimate receiver
is smaller than that of the eavesdropper (e.g., due to longer
distance from the legitimate transmitter), in order to achieve
positive secrecy rates, the exploitation of the wireless channel
small-scale fading in time, frequency, and/or space becomes
essential, and various techniques such as power control in time
and/or frequency as well as multi-antenna beamforming have
been investigated. In [23], power control with rate adaptation
over fading channels is proposed to maximize the average
secrecy rate. This work is also extended to characterize the se-
crecy rate region of parallel-fading broadcast channels [24]. In
[25], power control over frequency subcarriers is investigated
for secrecy rate maximization in an orthogonal frequency-
division multiple access (OFDMA) system. In [26], joint
power control on information signal and artificial noise (AN)
is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate of a simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) system.
In multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems, transmit
beamforming can be jointly employed with AN transmission to
effectively enhance the legitimate link capacity and at the same
time degrade that of the eavesdropping link. For example,
the legitimate transmitter can use beamforming to steer a
null to the eavesdropper, or send AN in the direction of the
eavesdropper to interferer with it [27]. In [28], beamforming is
jointly designed with channel coding to achieve unconditional
security in MIMO communications. If one or more relay
helpers are available, they can also cooperatively send AN
or jamming signals to interfere with the eavesdroppers to
achieve better secrecy communication performance. In [29],
optimal cooperative jamming via relays is studied to maximize
the secrecy rate of a single-antenna point-to-point legitimate
link. Besides, transmission scheduling by exploiting multiuser
channel diversity is another effective approach to improve the
secrecy communication performance in a system with mul-
tiple legitimate users/eavesdroppers. In [30], a transmission
scheduling scheme is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate
of a multiuser cognitive radio network. In [31], it is shown that
for a terrestrial point-to-point wireless communication system,
a moving receiver can achieve better secrecy performance than
that of the system with a static receiver.
However, there are still two major challenges that remain
unsolved in the existing physical layer security literature.
First, the practically achievable secrecy rate can be severely
limited if the distance between the legitimate transmitter and
its intended receiver is fixed and significantly larger than
that between it and a potential eavesdropper, even if the
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Fig. 1. A UAV wireless communication system consisting of a UAV above
ground and a node on the ground. A potential eavesdropper on the ground
intends to intercept the wireless communication between them.
various approaches mentioned above are applied. Second, the
channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is usually
required at the legitimate transmitter for the implementation of
effective power control and/or beamforming techniques. This
is practically challenging since the eavesdropper is usually a
passive device and thus it is difficult to estimate such CSI.
In this paper, we study physical layer security in UAV-ground
communications, which may potentially overcome the above
two critical issues in conventional studies. First, in contrast
to the existing literature with fixed or quasi-static nodes only,
the high mobility of UAVs can be exploited to proactively
establish stronger links with the legitimate ground nodes
and/or degrade the channels of the eavesdroppers, by flying
closer/farther to/from them, respectively, via proper trajectory
design. This approach is particularly effective in the context
of UAV-ground communications (as compared to conventional
terrestrial communications), since the LoS links are usually
much more dominant over other channel impairments such
as shadowing and small-scale fading, due to the much larger
height of the UAV than typical ground nodes such as mobile
terminals or BSs. Furthermore, since the LoS channel gain is
only determined by the link distance, the UAV can practically
obtain the channel gain to any potential eavesdropper on
the ground if its location is known, which thus resolves the
eavesdropper-CSI issue in the existing literature. Note that the
location of any ground node as a potential eavesdropper can
be practically detected and tracked by the UAV via using an
optical camera or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) equipped on
the UAV [36], [37].
For an initial exposition, in this paper we consider a simpli-
fied three-node secrecy UAV-ground communication system as
shown in Fig. 1, where a UAV at fixed altitude intends to com-
municate with a ground node, while a potential eavesdropper
on the ground may intercept their communication. The secure
communications of both UAV-to-ground (U2G) and ground-to-
UAV (G2U) links are considered. In the U2G case, the UAV
and the ground node are the legitimate transmitter and receiver,
respectively, where both the legitimate and eavesdropping
links are modeled as LoS channels. By contrast, in the G2U
case, the ground node and the UAV are the legitimate transmit-
ter and receiver, respectively. Since the legitimate transmitter
3and potential eavesdropper are both on the ground in this
case, different from the U2G case, only the legitimate link
is modeled as a LoS channel, while the eavesdropping link is
practically modeled as a channel consisting of both distance-
dependent path-loss and small-scale Rayleigh fading. Thus,
the problem formulations for the secrecy rate maximization in
these two cases are generally different, which will be detailed
later in this paper. Nevertheless, the secrecy rates of both U2G
and G2U transmissions can benefit from the joint design of
UAV trajectory and transmit power control at the legitimate
transmitter (i.e., UAV and ground node in the U2G and G2U
cases, respectively), explained as follows. On one hand, the
location of the UAV can be adjusted dynamically to establish
stronger channels for the legitimate link than that for the eaves-
dropping link. On the other hand, due to practical constraints
such as the UAV’s initial and final locations, the legitimate
link may not be always stronger than the eavesdropping link
during the whole flight period of the UAV. In this case, transmit
power can be adapted to the channel variations arising from
the UAV’s movement to further improve the secrecy rate. For
example, in the U2G case, the UAV should transmit higher
power when it flies closer to the ground node while being
more far away from the eavesdropper, and transmit lower or
zero power otherwise.
Motivated by this, we aim to design joint UAV trajectory
and transmit power optimization algorithms to secure both
U2G and G2U communications. Our goal is to maximize the
average secrecy rate over a finite flight period of the UAV in
each case, subject to the practical mobility constraints on the
UAV’s maximum speed and its initial and final locations, as
well as the average and peak transmit power constraints. For
the U2G case, the formulated joint trajectory optimization and
power control problem for average secrecy rate maximization
is difficult to be solved directly due to its non-smooth objective
function. To tackle this difficulty, we reformulate the problem
into an equivalent problem with a smooth objective function
without loss of optimality. Although the non-smoothness issue
is resolved, the reformulated problem is still non-convex due
to the coupling of the transmit power and UAV trajectory
optimization variables. We thus propose an efficient iterative
algorithm for solving this problem approximately based on the
block coordinate descent method. Specifically, we divide the
optimization variables into two blocks, one for transmit power
control and the other for UAV trajectory optimization. Then
the two blocks of variables are optimized alternately in an
iterative manner, i.e., in each iteration one block is optimized
with the other block fixed and vice versa. One corresponding
sub-problem that optimizes the UAV trajectory under given
transmit power is still difficult to solve due to its non-
convexity. We thus apply the successive convex optimization
method to solve the problem approximately. Finally, we show
that our proposed joint optimization algorithm is guaranteed
to converge. On the other hand, for the G2U case, similar
to the U2G case, we also propose an efficient algorithm to
solve the formulated problem by using the block coordinate
descent and successive convex optimization methods, while
some modification is made in the problem formulation to deal
with the non-LoS channel of the eavesdropper link in this
case. Simulation results show that the proposed joint trajectory
and transmit power designs can improve the average secrecy
rates in both U2G and G2U communications, as compared
to other benchmark schemes without applying the trajectory
optimization and/or transmit power control. Furthermore, it
is observed that trajectory optimization and transmit power
control are both essential for the U2G case, while for the G2U
case, trajectory optimization is less effective as compared to
power control.
It is worth noting that UAV systems, there have been
prior works (e.g., [38]–[40]) that address the security and
safety issues of UAVs from other perspectives. In [38], the
security vulnerabilities in the global positioning system (GPS)
spoofing attack and WiFi attack in UAV applications have
been addressed, and effective solutions to these attacks have
been suggested. In [39], a monocular camera and inertial
measurement unit (IMU) sensor based GPS spoofing detec-
tion scheme and an image localization approach for UAV
autonomous return have been proposed to support the security
and safety of UAVs. In [40], a biometric system based on
encryption has been proposed to secure the communication
link between a UAV and a BS on the ground. Note that
these prior works are fundamentally different from this paper
which applies the physical layer security technique to deal
with the eavesdropping attack in UAV-ground communication
systems. It is also noted that there have been prior works
(e.g., [11]–[14], [16], [41], [42]) on trajectory optimization for
various UAV communication systems, which consider different
system setups and design objectives. In [11], three funda-
mental tradeoffs in UAV-enabled wireless networks have been
identified, i.e., throughput-delay tradeoff, throughput-energy
tradeoff, and delay-energy tradeoff. In [12], a UAV mobile
BS serving multiple users is considered, where the UAV
trajectory and multiuser scheduling are jointly designed to
maximize the minimum throughput of the users. In particular,
it is shown in [13] that significant communication throughput
gains can be achieved by mobile UAVs over static UAVs/fixed
terrestrial BSs by exploiting the new design degree of freedom
of UAV trajectory optimization, especially for delay-tolerant
applications. To study the fundamental limits of the UAV-
enabled wireless network, the capacity region of a two-user
broadcast channel is characterized in [14] where it has been
rigorously proved that a simple “fly-hover-fly” trajectory is
capacity achieving. In [16], a UAV-enabled mobile relaying
system is investigated, where the UAV trajectory and transmit
power are jointly designed to maximize the throughput. In
[41], the UAV flying heading is optimized to maximize the
achievable sum rate from ground nodes to a UAV by assuming
a constant flying speed. In [42], a new design paradigm that
jointly considers both the communication throughput and the
UAV’s flying energy consumption is proposed to maximize
the energy efficiency of a point-to-point U2G communication
system. Different from these prior works, in this paper, we
apply both trajectory optimization and transmit power control
to maximize the secrecy rates of both U2G and G2U commu-
nications. The main contributions of this paper are highlighted
as follows.
4• Compared to the existing physical layer security litera-
ture, this paper is the first to exploit the high mobility of
UAVs to improve the secrecy rate via joint trajectory and
power control optimization.
• Both the U2G and G2U cases in UAV-ground commu-
nications are considered. The considered problems for
both the two cases are difficult to be solved optimally
due to their non-smooth and non-concave objective func-
tions. To tackle this difficulty, we first reformulate the
problems into equivalent problems with smooth objec-
tive functions, and then propose efficient algorithms to
solve the reformulated problems approximately based on
the block coordinate descent method and the successive
convex optimization method. The obtained results show
the fundamental secrecy rate limits of the U2G and
G2U communications and demonstrate the importance
and necessity of the joint UAV trajectory and transmit
power optimization in maximizing the secrecy rate for
the new settings. Moreover, the obtained results provide
different design guidelines for the U2G case and the G2U
case, respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the system model and problem formulation.
Sections III and IV present joint trajectory optimization and
transmit power control algorithms for the U2G and G2U cases,
respectively. Section V provides simulation results to validate
the performance of the proposed algorithms as compared to
three benchmark schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a UAV-enabled wireless
communication system where a UAV above ground and a
node on the ground communicate with each other, while a
potential eavesdropper on the ground aims to intercept the
communications between them. Without loss of generality,
we consider a three-dimensional (3D) Cartesian coordinate
system with the ground node and the eavesdropper located at
(xG, yG, 0) and (xE, yE, 0) in meters (m), respectively. Their
locations are assumed to be fixed and known to the UAV,
where the location of the eavesdropper can be detected by
using an optical camera or SAR equipped on the UAV. On
the other hand, the obtained secrecy rate when the location of
the eavesdropper is known serves as an upper bound for that
when the location of the eavesdropper is not known.
We consider a given finite flight period of the UAV, with the
duration denoted by T in seconds (s). It is assumed that the
UAV flies at a fixed altitude of H in m above ground, which
can be considered as the minimum altitude required for safety
considerations such as terrain or building avoidance. The
coordinate of the UAV over time is denoted as (x(t), y(t), H)
in m, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . For convenience, we divide the period
T into N time slots with equal length, i.e., T = Ndt, with
dt in s denoting the length of a time slot, which is chosen
sufficiently small such that the UAV’s location can be regarded
as unchanged within each time slot from the viewpoint of the
ground node. As a result, the UAV’s coordinate in slot n can be
denoted as (x[n], y[n], H), and the UAV’s horizontal trajectory
(x(t), y(t)) over the flight period T can be approximated by
the sequence {x[n], y[n]}Nn=1. Denote the maximum speed
of the UAV as vmax in m/s. Thus, the maximum flying
distance of the UAV in each slot is D = vmaxdt. The initial
and final locations of the UAV are assumed to be given,
which are denoted by (x0, y0, H) and (xF , yF , H) in m,
respectively. For the UAV trajectory to be feasible, we assume
that the distance between the initial and final location satisfies
that
√
(xF − x0)2 + (yF − y0)2 ≤ vmaxT . As a result, the
mobility constraints of the UAV can be expressed as
(x[1]− x0)
2 + (y[1]− y0)
2 ≤ D2, (1a)
(x[n+ 1]− x[n])2 + (y[n+ 1]− y[n])2 ≤ D2,
n = 1, . . . , N − 1, (1b)
(xF − x[N ])
2 + (yF − y[N ])
2 ≤ D2. (1c)
We consider both the U2G and G2U communications in
the system of interest, which are specified in detail in the
following, respectively.
1) U2G Transmission: In the U2G case, the UAV and
the ground node play the roles of legitimate transmitter and
receiver, respectively. The legitimate link from the UAV to
the ground node and the eavesdropping link from the UAV to
the eavesdropper are both assumed to be LoS channels, as the
recent measurement results in [43] have shown that the LoS
model offers a good approximation for practical UAV-ground
communications. Thus, the LoS channel power gain from the
UAV to the ground node in time slot n follows the free-space
path loss model, given by
gUG[n] = β0d
−2
UG[n] =
β0
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
,
(2)
where β0 denotes the channel power gain at the reference
distance d0 = 1m, which depends on the carrier frequency and
the antenna gains of the transmitter and receiver, and dUG[n] =√
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2 is the distance from the
UAV to the ground node in time slot n. Similarly, the LoS
channel power gain from the UAV to the eavesdropper in time
slot n is given by
gUE[n] =
β0
(x[n]− xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
. (3)
We denote p[n] as the transmit power of the UAV in time
slot n. In practice, p[n]’s are usually subject to both average
and peak limits over time, denoted by P¯ and Ppeak, respec-
tively. Thus, the transmit power constraints are expressed as
1
N
N∑
n=1
p[n] ≤ P¯ , (4a)
0 ≤ p[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n. (4b)
To make the constraint in (4a) non-trivial, we assume P¯ <
Ppeak in this paper. In the absence of the eavesdropper,
the achievable rate from the UAV to the ground node in
bits/second/Hertz (bps/Hz) in time slot n can be expressed
5as
RUG[n] = log2
(
1 +
p[n]gUG[n]
σ2
)
= log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
,
(5)
where σ2 is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power
at the receiver and γ0 = β0/σ
2 is the reference signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). Similarly, the achievable rate from the UAV to
the eavesdropper in bps/Hz in time slot n is given by
RUE[n] = log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n] − xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
)
.
(6)
With (5) and (6), the average secrecy rate achievable for the
U2G link in bps/Hz over the total N time slots is given by
[23]
R(U2G)sec
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n] − xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
)]+
,
(7)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0).
2) G2U Transmission: In the G2U case, the ground node
and the UAV play the roles of legitimate transmitter and
receiver, respectively. The legitimate channel from the ground
node to the UAV is assumed to be LoS, similar as in the U2G
case, whose channel power gain in time slot n is given by
gGU[n] =
β0
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
. (8)
Since both the ground node and the eavesdropper are on the
ground, the eavesdropping channel between them is assumed
to constitute both distance-dependent path loss with pass-loss
exponent κ ≥ 2 and small-scale Rayleigh fading. Thus, the
channel power gain from the ground node to the eavesdropper
at any time is given by
gGE =
β0
dκGE
ζ, (9)
where dGE =
√
(xG − xE)2 + (yG − yE)2 denotes the distance
between the ground node and the eavesdropper, and ζ is
an exponentially distributed random variable with unit mean
accounting for the Rayleigh fading.
We denote q[n] as the transmit power of the ground node
in time slot n. Similar to the U2G case, q[n]’s are constrained
by average power limit Q¯ and peak power limit Qpeak, i.e.,
1
N
N∑
n=1
q[n] ≤ Q¯, (10a)
0 ≤ q[n] ≤ Qpeak, ∀n, (10b)
where Q¯ < Qpeak is assumed. Similar to (5), the achievable
rate from the ground node to the UAV in bps/Hz in time slot
n can be expressed as
RGU[n] = log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
.
(11)
The achievable rate from the ground node to the eavesdropper
in bps/Hz in time slot n is expressed as
RGE[n] = Eζ
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
dκGE
ζ
)]
(12a)
≤ log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
dκGE
Eζ [ζ]
)
(12b)
= log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
dκGE
)
, (12c)
where Eζ [·] in (12a) denotes the mathematical expectation with
respect to random variable ζ, and the inequality in (12b) is due
to Jensen’s inequality and the fact that log2(1+ γ0q[n]ζ/d
κ
GE)
is concave with respect to ζ. (12c) shows an upper bound of
RGE[n]. We consider the worst-case secrecy rate performance
by assuming that the eavesdropper is able to achieve this upper
bound. With (11) and (12c), the following average secrecy rate
of the G2U link in bps/Hz over the total N time slots is thus
achievable,
R(G2U)sec
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
dκGE
)]+
. (13)
B. Problem Formulation
For the U2G case, our goal is to maximize the average
secrecy rate R
(U2G)
sec in (7) by jointly optimizing the UAV’s
transmit power p , [p[1], . . . , p[N ]]
†
and the UAV’s trajectory
in terms of its horizontal coordinates x , [x[1], . . . , x[N ]]
†
and y , [y[1], . . . , y[N ]]† over all the N time slots, where the
superscript † denotes the transpose operation. The optimization
variables are subject to the UAV’s mobility constraints in (1)
and the average and peak transmit power constraints in (4). We
formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem as follows
(by dropping the constant term 1/N in (7))1
(P1) :
max
x,y,p
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
)]+
(14)
s.t. (1), (4).
Similarly, for the G2U case, we maximize R
(G2U)
sec in (13)
by jointly optimizing the ground node’s transmit power q ,
1Generally, the UAV’s flying altitude can also be optimized by adding the
minimum and the maximum altitude constraints. However, it is easy to verify
that for our considered problem the optimal objective value can be always
achieved at the minimum UAV altitude under the LoS air-to-ground channel
model.
6[q[1], . . . , q[N ]]
†
and the UAV’s horizontal trajectory x and y.
The problem is thus formulated as
(P2) :
max
x,y,q
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
dκGE
)]+
(15)
s.t. (1), (10).
Note that different from problem (P1), only the first log-
arithmic function in the objective of (P2), i.e., log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
(x[n]−xG)2+(y[n]−yG)2+H2
)
, contains the UAV trajectory vari-
ables. This is because the achievable rate from the ground
node to the eavesdropper does not depend on the trajectory of
the UAV.
Problems (P1) and (P2) are both difficult to be solved
optimally due to the following two reasons. First, the operator
[·]+ makes the objective functions of (P1) and (P2) non-
smooth at zero value. Second, even without [·]+, their objective
functions are non-concave with respect to either x, y, or p. In
Sections III and IV, we propose efficient algorithms for solving
problems (P1) and (P2) approximately, respectively.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR PROBLEM (P1)
First, we consider problem (P1) for the U2G case. To handle
the non-smoothness of the objective function of (P1), the
following lemma is used.
Lemma 1. Problem (P1) has the same optimal value as that
of the following problem,
(P3) :
max
x,y,p
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
)]
(16)
s.t. (1), (4).
Proof. Denote L1 and L3 as the optimal values of (P1) and
(P3), respectively. First, we have L1 ≥ L3, since the objective
function of (P1) is no smaller than that of (P3), and (P1) and
(P3) have the same constraints.
Next, we show L3 ≥ L1 also holds. Denote (x
∗,y∗,p∗) as
the optimal solution to (P1), where x∗ = [x∗[1], . . . , x∗[N ]]†,
y∗ = [y∗[1], . . . , y∗[N ]]†, and p∗ = [p∗[1], . . . , p∗[N ]]†.
Define
f(x[n], y[n], p[n])
, log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0p[n]
(x[n]− xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
)
.
We construct a feasible solution to (P3), termed (x˜, y˜, p˜), such
that x˜ = x∗, y˜ = y∗, and the elements of p˜ are obtained as
p˜[n] =
{
p∗[n] f(x∗[n], y∗[n], p∗[n]) ≥ 0,
0 f(x∗[n], y∗[n], p∗[n]) < 0.
Denote L˜ as the objective value of (P3) attained at (x˜, y˜, p˜).
The newly constructed solution (x˜, y˜, p˜) ensures that L˜ = L1.
Since (x˜, y˜, p˜) is a feasible solution to (P3), it follows that
L3 ≥ L˜, and thus L3 ≥ L1. Therefore, L1 = L3, which
completes the proof.
Based on Lemma 1, we only need to focus on solv-
ing problem (P3). Although problem (P3) resolves the non-
smoothness issue, it is still non-convex and difficult to solve.
However, we observe that the constraint (1) contains only
the variables (x,y) for UAV trajectory optimization and the
constraint (4) contains only the variables p for transmit power
control. As such, the optimization variables of (P3) can be
partitioned into two blocks, i.e., p and (x,y), respectively,
which facilitates the development of an iterative algorithm for
solving problem (P3) by applying the block coordinate descent
method. Specifically, we solve problem (P3) by solving the
following two sub-problems iteratively: one (denoted by sub-
problem 1) optimizes the transmit power p under given UAV
trajectory (x,y), while the other (denoted by sub-problem
2) optimizes the UAV trajectory (x,y) under given transmit
power p, as detailed in the next two subsections, respectively.
Then, we present the overall algorithm and show that it is
guaranteed to converge.
A. Sub-Problem 1: Optimizing Transmit Power Given UAV
Trajectory
For given UAV trajectory (x,y), sub-problem 1 can be
expressed as
max
p
N∑
n=1
[
log2 (1 + anp[n])− log2 (1 + bnp[n])
]
(17)
s.t. (4),
where
an =
γ0
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
, (18)
bn =
γ0
(x[n]− xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
. (19)
Although problem (17) is non-convex, it has been shown in
[23] and [33] that the optimal solution can be obtained as
p∗[n] =
{
min ([pˆ[n]]+, Ppeak) an > bn,
0 an ≤ bn,
(20)
where
pˆ[n] =
√(
1
2bn
−
1
2an
)2
+
1
λ ln 2
(
1
bn
−
1
an
)
−
1
2bn
−
1
2an
.
(21)
In (21), λ ≥ 0 is a constant that ensures the average power
constraint 1
N
∑N
n=1 p[n] ≤ P¯ to be satisfied when the optimal
7solution of problem (17) is attained, which can be found
efficiently via a one-dimensional bisection search [33], [44].
B. Sub-Problem 2: Optimizing UAV Trajectory Given Transmit
Power
For given transmit power p, by letting Pn = γ0p[n], we can
express sub-problem 2 as
max
x,y
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
Pn
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pn
(x[n]− xE)2 + (y[n]− yE)2 +H2
)]
(22)
s.t. (1).
Note that the objective function of problem (22) is non-
concave with respect to x and y, so it is a non-convex
optimization problem and cannot be solved optimally in
general. By introducing slack variables t , [t[1], . . . , t[N ]]
†
and u , [u[1], . . . , u[N ]]
†
, we first consider the following
problem,
max
x,y,t,u
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
Pn
u[n]
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pn
t[n]
)]
(23a)
s.t. t[n]− x2[n] + 2xEx[n]− x
2
E − y
2[n] + 2yEy[n]
− y2E −H
2 ≤ 0, ∀n, (23b)
x2[n]− 2xGx[n] + x
2
G + y
2[n]− 2yGy[n] + y
2
G
+H2 − u[n] ≤ 0, ∀n, (23c)
t[n] ≥ H2, ∀n, (23d)
(1).
At the optimal solution of problem (23), constraints (23b) and
(23c) should hold with equalities, since otherwise t[n] (u[n])
can be increased (decreased) to improve the objective value.
Therefore, problems (22) and (23) have the same optimal value
and optimal solution of (x,y). Next, we focus on solving
problem (23).
The term log2
(
1 + Pn
u[n]
)
in (23a) is convex with respect
to u[n], and the terms −x2[n] and −y2[n] in (23b) are
concave with respect to x[n] and y[n], respectively. However, a
maximization problem with a non-concave objective function
and/or a non-convex feasible region is in general non-convex
and thus difficult to be solved optimally. Based on the facts
that the first-order Taylor expansion of a convex function
is its global under-estimator and that of a concave function
is its global over-estimator [44], we propose an iterative
algorithm to solve problem (23) approximately by applying
the successive convex optimization method. The algorithm
obtains an approximate solution to problem (23) by maximiz-
ing a concave lower bound of its objective function within a
convex feasible region, which is detailed as follows. First, the
algorithm assumes a given initial point (xfea,yfea,ufea) which
is feasible to (23), where xfea , [xfea[1], . . . , xfea[N ]]
†
, yfea ,
[yfea[1], . . . , yfea[N ]]
†
, and ufea , [ufea[1], . . . , ufea[N ]]
†
. Then,
by using the first-order Taylor expansions of log2
(
1 + Pn
u[n]
)
,
−x2[n], and −y2[n] at the points ufea[n], xfea[n], and yfea[n],
respectively, i.e.,
log2
(
1 +
Pn
u[n]
)
≥ log2
(
1 +
Pn
ufea[n]
)
−
Pn(u[n]− ufea[n])
ln 2(u2fea[n] + Pnufea[n])
, (24)
− x2[n] ≤ x2fea[n]− 2xfea[n]x[n], (25)
− y2[n] ≤ y2fea[n]− 2yfea[n]y[n], (26)
problem (23) is approximated as
max
x,y,t,u
N∑
n=1
[
−
Pnu[n]
ln 2(u2fea[n] + Pnufea[n])
− log2
(
1 +
Pn
t[n]
)]
(27a)
s.t. t[n] + x2fea[n]− 2xfea[n]x[n] + 2xEx[n]− x
2
E + y
2
fea[n]
− 2yfea[n]y[n] + 2yEy[n]− y
2
E −H
2 ≤ 0, ∀n, (27b)
(1), (23c), (23d).
After such approximation, we note that the objective function
of problem (27) is concave and its feasible region is convex.
Thus, problem (27) is a convex optimization problem, which
can be optimally solved by the interior-point method [44].
Since the first-order Taylor expansions of −x2[n] and −y2[n]
are their global over-estimators, any solution (x[n], y[n]) sat-
isfying (27b) will satisfy (23b). As a result, the solution
of problem (27) is guaranteed to be a feasible solution of
problem (23). Moreover, the first-order Taylor expansion of
log2
(
1 + Pn
u[n]
)
is its global under-estimator. As such, prob-
lem (27) maximizes a lower bound of the objective function of
problem (23), and the lower bound and the objective function
of (23) are equal only at the given point (xfea,yfea,ufea); thus,
the objective value of problem (23) with the solution obtained
by solving problem (27) is no smaller than that with the given
point (xfea,yfea,ufea).
C. Overall Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Proposed Algorithm for Problem (P1).
1: Initialization: Set k = 0. Find an initial feasible solution
(p(0),x(0),y(0)) and an initial slack variable u(0). Set
R(0) = f(P3)(p
(0),x(0),y(0)).
2: repeat
3: Set k = k + 1.
4: With given p(k−1), set the feasible solution xfea =
x(k−1), yfea = y
(k−1) and ufea = u
(k−1), then update
the trajectory variable (x(k),y(k)) and the slack variable
u(k) by solving problem (27).
5: With given (x(k),y(k)), update the transmit power
control variable p(k) using (20).
6: Set R(k) = f(P3)(p
(k),x(k),y(k)).
7: until R
(k)−R(k−1)
R(k)
< ǫ.
In summary, the overall algorithm can find a suboptimal
solution to problem (P1) by applying the block coordinate
descent method, and solves the two sub-problems (17) and
8(27) alternately in an iterative manner. The details of the
proposed algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 1, where
R(k) = f(P3)(p
(k),x(k),y(k)) denotes the objective value of
problem (P3) with variables p(k), x(k), and y(k) in iteration k,
and ǫ denotes a small positive threshold indicating the accuracy
of convergence. The convergence of Algorithm 1 is proved as
follows. First, we show that in iteration k (k ≥ 1) of Algorithm
1, the objective value of problem (P3) is non-decreasing after
executing steps 4 and 5. Denote φ(x,y,p) as the objective
value of problem (P3), and ξ(x,y,u,p) and ξlb(x,y,u,p) as
the objective values of problems (23) and (27), respectively.
In step 4, we have the following results:
φ(x(k−1),y(k−1),p(k−1))
= ξ(x(k−1),y(k−1),u(k−1),p(k−1)) (28a)
= ξlb(x
(k−1),y(k−1),u(k−1),p(k−1)) (28b)
≤ ξlb(x
(k),y(k),u(k),p(k−1)) (28c)
≤ ξ(x(k),y(k),u(k),p(k−1)) (28d)
= φ(x(k),y(k),p(k−1)), (28e)
where (28a) and (28e) hold because problems (22) and
(23) have the same optimal value and optimal solution of
(x,y); (28b) holds because the first-order Taylor expan-
sions in (24), (25), and (26) are tight at the feasible point
(xfea,yfea,ufea) = (x
(k−1),y(k−1),u(k−1)); (28c) holds be-
cause (x(k),y(k),u(k)) is the optimal solution to problem (27);
(28d) holds because the objective value of problem (27) is a
lower bound of that of problem (23). Moreover, in step 5, we
have the following inequality
φ(x(k),y(k),p(k−1)) ≤ φ(x(k),y(k),p(k)), (29)
because p(k) is the optimal solution to problem (17). Based
on (28) and (29), we obtain
φ(x(k−1),y(k−1),p(k−1)) ≤ φ(x(k),y(k),p(k)), (30)
which means that the objective value of problem (P3) is non-
decreasing over iterations in Algorithm 1. In addition, since
the optimal value of (P3) is upper-bounded by a finite value,
Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge. The complexity of
Algorithm 1 can be shown to be of O(NiteN
3.5), where Nite
denotes the iteration number.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR PROBLEM (P2)
In this section, we consider problem (P2) for the G2U case.
Similar to (P1), we solve problem (P2) by considering the
following equivalent problem,
(P4) :
max
x,y,q
N∑
n=1
[
log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
− log2
(
1 +
γ0q[n]
dκGE
)]
(31)
s.t. (1), (10).
Although problem (P4) is non-convex, it has a similar structure
as problem (P3), which facilitates us to also apply the block
coordinate descent method to find an approximate solution for
it. Like (P3), problem (P4) can also be decomposed into two
sub-problems: one (denoted by sub-problem 3) is to optimize
transmit power q under given trajectory (x,y); while the other
(denoted by sub-problem 4) is to optimize trajectory (x,y)
under given transmit power q. The two sub-problems are
solved alternately in an iterative manner until convergence.
Next, we discuss on how to solve the two sub-problems,
respectively.
A. Sub-Problem 3: Optimizing Transmit Power Given UAV
Trajectory
With given (x,y), sub-problem 3 can be expressed as
max
q
N∑
n=1
[
log2 (1 + anq[n])− log2 (1 + bq[n])
]
(32)
s.t. (10),
where an is defined in (18) and
b =
γ0
dκGE
. (33)
Problem (32) is similar to sub-problem 1 given in (17), thus
it can be solved by using (20) and (21), provided that bn in
(20) and (21) is replaced with b in (33).
B. Sub-Problem 4: Optimizing UAV Trajectory Given Transmit
Power
With given q, by letting Qn = γ0q[n] and removing the
terms in the objective function in (31) which are irrelevant to
x and y, we express sub-problem 4 as
max
x,y
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
Qn
(x[n]− xG)2 + (y[n]− yG)2 +H2
)
(34)
s.t. (1).
Unlike sub-problem 2 given in (22) for the U2G case, problem
(34) is simplified as maximizing only the average achievable
rate from the ground node to the UAV. This is because the
trajectory of the UAV determines only the channel gain from
the ground node to the UAV, but does not have any effect on
the channel from the ground node to the eavesdropper.
Despite the non-convexity of problem (34), we apply the
successive convex optimization to approximately solve it,
similar to problem (22). First, we introduce slack variable
u , [u[1], . . . , u[N ]]†, and solve the following problem which
has the same optimal solution of (x,y) as problem (34),
max
x,y,u
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1 +
Qn
u[n]
)
(35a)
s.t. (x[n]− xG)
2 + (y[n]− yG)
2 +H2 − u[n] ≤ 0, ∀n,
(35b)
(1).
With a given initial point ufea , [ufea[1], . . . , ufea[N ]]
†, which
is feasible to (35), and by applying the first-order Taylor
9expansion of log2
(
1 + Qn
u[n]
)
given in (24) (where Pn is
replaced by Qn), problem (35) is recast as
max
x,y,u
N∑
n=1
−
Qnu[n]
ln 2(u2fea[n] +Qnufea[n])
(36)
s.t. (1), (35b).
In can be shown that problem (36) is a convex quadratically
constrained quadratic programming (QCQP) problem, and thus
can be efficiently solved by the interior-point method [44]. The
details of the overall algorithm for solving (P2) are omitted
for brevity, given the similarity to that for (P1).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to verify the
performance of our proposed joint UAV trajectory optimiza-
tion and transmit power control algorithm (denoted as T-OPT-
With-PC). For comparison, we also consider the following
three benchmark schemes without optimized trajectory and/or
power control:
• Trajectory optimization without transmit power control
(denoted as T-OPT-Without-PC);
• Best-effort trajectory design with transmit power control
(denoted as BET-With-PC);
• Best-effort trajectory design without transmit power con-
trol (denoted as BET-Without-PC).
Specifically, the T-OPT-Without-PC algorithm designs the
UAV trajectories for the U2G and G2U cases by solving prob-
lems (27) and (36) iteratively until convergence, respectively,
with transmit power equally set over time, i.e., p[n] = P¯
and q[n] = Q¯, ∀n. The complexity of the T-OPT-Without-
PC algorithm is O(NiteN
3.5), where Nite denotes the number
of iterations required for convergence [35]. Both the BET-
With-PC and BET-Without-PC algorithms design the UAV
trajectories in the following heuristic best-effort manner: the
UAV first flies straight to the point above the ground node
at its maximum speed, then remains static at that point (if
time permits), and finally flies at its maximum speed to reach
its final location by the end of the last time slot. Note that
if the UAV does not have sufficient time to reach the point
above the ground node, it will turn at a certain midway point
and then fly to the final location at the maximum speed.
Given this trajectory, the BET-With-PC algorithm optimizes
the transmit power in the U2G or G2U case by solving
problem (17) or (32), respectively; while the BET-Without-
PC algorithm sets transmit power equally over time, i.e.,
p[n] = P¯ and q[n] = Q¯, ∀n. The complexities of the BET-
With-PC and BET-Without-PC algorithms are bothO(N). The
initial feasible solutions for the proposed T-OPT-With-PC and
benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC algorithms are generated by
the BET-Without-PC algorithm.
The coordinates of the ground node and the eavesdropper
are set as (0, 0, 0)m and (200, 0, 0)m, respectively, and the
flying altitude of the UAV is set as H = 100m. The maximum
speed of the UAV is vmax = 3m/s. The flight period T is
divided into multiple time slots with equal length of dt = 0.5s.
The communication bandwidth is 20MHz with the carrier
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Fig. 2. Trajectories of the UAV for the U2G communication in Case 1.
frequency at 5GHz, and the noise power spectrum density
is −169dBm/Hz. Thus, the reference SNR at the reference
distance d0 = 1m is γ0 = 80dB. The peak transmit power
limits for the U2G and G2U links are set as Ppeak = 4P¯
and Qpeak = 4Q¯, respectively. The threshold in Algorithm
1 is set as ǫ = 10−4. We consider two cases, denoted as
Case 1 and Case 2, in which the UAV has different initial
and final locations. In Case 1, the UAV’s initial and final
locations are on the vertical line in the middle of the ground
node and the eavesdropper, and the coordinates of them are
set as (x0, y0) = (100, 600)m and (xF , yF ) = (100,−600)m,
as shown in Fig. 2. In Case 2, the UAV’s initial and final
locations are on the parallel line of that connecting the ground
node and the eavesdropper, and the coordinates of them are set
as (x0, y0) = (−500,−150)m and (xF , yF ) = (700,−150)m,
as shown in Figs. 5 and 9.
A. U2G Communication
In the U2G case, we first consider Case 1. Fig. 2 shows the
trajectories of the UAV by applying different algorithms with
different values of flight period T . The average transmit power
is set as P¯ = −5dBm. The locations of the ground node,
eavesdropper, as well as the UAV’s initial and final locations
are marked with ©, △, ×, and +, respectively. It is observed
that when T = 400s which is the minimum time required for
the UAV to fly from the initial location to the final location
in a straight line at the maximum speed, the trajectories of all
algorithms are identical. As T increases, the trajectories by the
proposed T-OPT-With-PC and the benchmark T-OPT-Without-
PC algorithms are still similar, i.e., the UAV tries to fly as close
as possible to the ground node and at the same time as far away
as possible to the eavesdropper, while they appear different
compared to that by the heuristic best-effort trajectory (BET)
design (same for with and without power control). When T is
sufficiently large, i.e. T = 600s, for the proposed T-OPT-With-
PC algorithm or the benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC algorithm,
it is observed that the UAV first flies at the maximum speed
to reach a certain location on the left of the ground node (not
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nication in Case 1.
directly above it), then remains stationary at this location as
long as possible, and finally flies to the final location in an
arc path at the maximum speed and reaches there by the end
of the last time slot. These stationary locations, which are on
the opposite direction of the eavesdropper, strike an optimal
balance between enhancing the legitimate link channel and
degrading the eavesdropping link channel and hence maximize
the secrecy rate in each of these two cases. In fact, this is also
why the UAV follows an arc path rather than the straight path
as in the heuristic BET design.
Fig. 3 shows the corresponding average secrecy rates of
different algorithms versus flight period T when P¯ = −5dBm
and 5dBm. It is observed that the secrecy rates of all al-
gorithms increase significantly with T . This is because for
all algorithms the maximum secrecy rate is achieved at their
respective stationary locations (see Fig. 2) for sufficiently large
T , and larger T results in longer hovering time at such lo-
cations for the UAV. The proposed T-OPT-With-PC algorithm
always achieves the highest secrecy rate, while the benchmark
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Fig. 5. Trajectories of the UAV for the U2G communication in Case 2.
BET-Without-PC algorithm has the lowest secrecy rate, as
expected. When P¯ = −5dBm, the benchmark BET-With-PC
algorithm has higher secrecy rate than that of the benchmark T-
OPT-Without-PC algorithm. In contrast, when P¯ = 5dBm, the
latter algorithm has higher secrecy rate than the former. Such
results suggest that in the low transmit power regime, power
control is more important for improving the secrecy rate; while
in the high transmit power regime, trajectory optimization is
more significant. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that
trajectory adaptation with increasing T is essential for the
secrecy rate improvement, even for the case with heuristic BET
design. Otherwise, if the trajectory is fixed (e.g., following
the straight line from the initial to final location with constant
speed of
√
(xF − x0)2 + (yF − y0)2/T regardless of T , then
the secrecy rate will remain unchanged as the case with
required minimum T = 400s in Fig. 3, i.e., the UAV cannot
exploit its mobility to improve the secrecy rate, even with
sufficiently large T .
Fig. 4 shows the average secrecy rates of different algo-
rithms versus the average transmit power P¯ when T = 403s
and 600s. It is observed that the proposed T-OPT-With-PC
algorithm always achieves the highest secrecy rate, while
the benchmark BET-Without-PC algorithm has the lowest
secrecy rate. In addition, when P¯ ≤ −5dB, we note that
the benchmark BET-With-PC algorithm achieves a secrecy
rate performance close to the proposed T-OPT-With-PC al-
gorithm, and also significantly outperforms the benchmark T-
OPT-Without-PC algorithm. However, when P¯ increases, the
secrecy rate of the benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC algorithm
will eventually exceed that of the benchmark BET-With-PC
algorithm and even get closer to that of the proposed T-OPT-
With-PC algorithm. Furthermore, the rate gap between the
benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC and BET-With-PC algorithms
becomes larger with increasing P¯ . The above results further
demonstrate that transmit power control is more effective in
improving secrecy rate than trajectory optimization when the
average transmit power is low, while trajectory optimization
is more effective when the average transmit power is high.
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Next, we consider Case 2. Fig. 5 shows the trajectories of
the UAV by using different algorithms when P¯ = −5dBm. It
is observed that different from the results in Case 1 shown
in Fig. 2, the trajectories by the proposed T-OPT-With-PC
and benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC algorithms with T = 405s
or 600s differ significantly, especially when the UAV flies
towards the final location. For the proposed algorithm, the
UAV flies along a relatively direct path towards the ground
node and then towards the final location. In contrast, for
this benchmark, the UAV first flies almost directly to the
ground node, but then flies along an arc path to the final
location, which inevitably consumes more time on the travel-
ing compared to the trajectory of the proposed algorithm. The
reason for such a difference is that in Case 2, flying from the
ground node towards the final location reduces the distance
from the UAV to the eavesdropper less much as compared
to that from it to the ground node, which is undesired. This
means that to improve the secrecy rate, the UAV should reduce
transmit power when it gets farther away from the ground
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Fig. 8. Secrecy rate versus average transmit power P¯ for the U2G commu-
nication in Case 2.
node and closer to the final location. Considering this fact,
the proposed T-OPT-With-PC algorithm is able to decrease
the UAV transmit power or even turn off the transmitter to
save power and also protect from eavesdropping when the
UAV flies directly towards the final location. However, for
the benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC algorithm that employs a
constant transmit power, the UAV can only rely on adjusting
its trajectory to keep far away from the eavesdropper to avoid
being eavesdropped, which however requires more traveling
time and leads to a longer arc trajectory. This fact is verified
by Fig. 6, which shows the transmit power of the UAV over
time slot when the flight period is T = 600s. It is observed
that both the proposed T-OPT-With-PC and benchmark BET-
With-PC algorithms increase UAV transmit power when the
UAV gets closer to the ground node, and reduce UAV transmit
power when the UAV gets farther away from the ground node
and closer to the final location. When the UAV is in the zone
where the distance from it to the ground node is larger than
that to the eavesdropper, the proposed T-OPT-With-PC and
benchmark BET-With-PC algorithms set UAV transmit power
to zero.
With the UAV trajectory difference in Fig. 5, the secrecy rate
performances of different algorithms versus T and P¯ , which
are shown in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively, are also quite different
from those shown in Figs. 3 and 4 for Case 1. Specifically,
the secrecy rate gaps between the proposed T-OPT-With-PC
and benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC algorithms versus T or P¯
in Case 2 are significantly larger than those in Case 1. For
example, in Fig. 7, the T-OPT-Without-PC algorithm even has
lower secrecy rate than the BET-Without-PC algorithm in the
regime of T ≤ 650s when P¯ = −5dBm or in the regime of
T ≤ 550s when P¯ = 5dBm. In addition, in Fig. 8, the T-
OPT-Without-PC algorithm has a lower secrecy rate than the
BET-Without-PC algorithm over the whole P¯ regime when
T = 405s and in the regime of P¯ ≤ 0dBm when T = 600s.
This is mainly because the UAV wastes more time on travelling
along a longer arc trajectory to reach the final location which
in turn leads to the inefficient use of the transmit power. The
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above results demonstrate the importance and necessity of the
joint UAV trajectory optimization and transmit power control
in maximizing the secrecy rate for U2G communication.
From Figs. 2–8, it is observed that although the proposed
T-OPT-With-PC algorithm always achieves the highest se-
crecy rate in all cases, other benchmark algorithms of lower
complexity may achieve reasonably good performance as
compared to the proposed algorithm in certain cases. As such,
depending on the system parameters (e.g., average transmit
power, flight period, and the UAV’s initial and final locations),
the UAV may adopt different algorithms to strike a balance
between the achievable performance and computational com-
plexity. In particular, for the case with short T and/or high P¯ ,
trajectory optimization is generally less effective as compared
to transmit power control in improving secrecy rate, thus the
benchmark algorithm BET-With-PC performs very close to
the proposed algorithm; while if both the initial and final
locations of the UAV are closer to the ground node than the
eavesdropper, trajectory optimization is more effective, thus
T-OPT-Without-PC is a good choice from both performance
and complexity considerations.
B. G2U Communication
In the G2U case, the channel gain from the ground node to
the eavesdropper given in (9) contains a small-scale Rayleigh
fading term ζ. Thus, all secrecy rate results in the following
are averaged over 5000 random independent realizations of ζ,
where the path-loss exponent is set as κ = 3. Since our results
obtained for Cases 1 and 2 lead to consistent observations, we
only present the results for Case 2 due to the space limitation.
Fig. 9 shows the trajectories of the UAV with different
values of T when the average transmit power is Q¯ = −5dBm.
It is observed that the trajectories of the proposed T-OPT-
With-PC and benchmark T-OPT-Without-PC algorithms are
very similar for different values of T , i.e., the UAV tries to fly
as close as possible to the ground node as T increases. When
T is sufficiently large, i.e., T = 600s, the trajectories of them
are the same as the heuristic BET design, i.e., the UAV first
flies at the maximum speed to reach the point right above
the ground node, then remains static as long as possible, and
finally flies to the final location directly at the maximum speed
in order to reach there by the end of the last time slot. The
fundamental reason of such a result is that in the G2U setup,
the channel between the ground node (transmitter) and the
eavesdropper is independent of the UAV’s location. Therefore,
the UAV trajectory is only optimized to maximize achievable
rate from the ground node to the UAV. Obviously, the point
right above the ground node is the best location for achieving
its largest rate. This explains why the optimized trajectory also
converges to the heuristic BET design when T is sufficiently
large.
Fig. 10 shows the average secrecy rates of different algo-
rithms versus flight period T when Q¯ = −5dBm and 5dBm.
When T ≥ 410s, the algorithms with transmit power control,
i.e. the proposed T-OPT-With-PC and benchmark BET-With-
PC algorithms, achieve the same secrecy rate since they
have the same trajectory and hence the same transmit power
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Case 2.
control, while they both outperform the benchmark algorithms
without power control, i.e., the T-OPT-Without-PC and BET-
Without-PC algorithms. These results suggest that transmit
power control is more effective than trajectory optimization
in improving secrecy rate in the G2U case, as shown in Fig.
9, since the optimal trajectory can be easily achieved by the
BET design when T is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the
secrecy rate gap between the algorithms with and without
power control when Q¯ = −5dBm is significantly larger than
that when Q¯ = 5dBm, since power control is more effective
when the average transmit power is low.
Fig. 11 shows the average secrecy rates of different algo-
rithms versus average transmit power Q¯ when T = 405s and
600s. It can be also observed that transmit power control is
effective for improving secrecy rate when Q¯ ≤ 0dBm. When
T = 405s, the secrecy rate gap between the proposed T-
OPT-With-PC algorithm and the benchmark algorithms with
BET design exists due to their trajectory difference. When
T = 600s, the secrecy rates of all algorithms tend to be very
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communication in Case 2.
similar when Q¯ ≥ 10dBm. This is because their trajectories
are the same and the power control only provides marginal
rate gain when transmit power is high.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the physical layer security for emerg-
ing UAV communications in the forthcoming 5G wireless net-
works. Specifically, we propose to enhance the security perfor-
mance by proactively controlling channel gains via adjusting
the UAV trajectory in addition to applying the conventional
power/rate adaptation, which leads to a new joint optimization
framework. For both the U2G and G2U communications, the
transmit power control and UAV trajectory are jointly designed
to maximize the average secrecy rate over a finite horizon,
subject to the average and peak transmit power constraints as
well as practical UAV’s mobility constraints. By applying the
block coordinate descent and successive convex optimization
methods, efficient iterative algorithms are proposed to solve
the joint design problems. Simulation results show that joint
trajectory optimization and transmit power control improves
the physical layer security performance, and more significantly
in the U2G case compared to the G2U case, as the UAV
trajectory in the U2G case has an effect on both the legitimate
and eavesdropping channels, instead of the legitimate channel
only in the G2U case. Furthermore, it is found that both
UAV trajectory optimization and transmit power control are
generally necessary in the U2G case; while in the G2U case,
transmit power control is more effective than UAV trajectory
optimization for improving the secrecy rate performance, and
the heuristic best-effort trajectory already performs quite close
to the optimized trajectory.
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